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I was delighted to receive Professor Jay Feinman’s invitation to comment. Not
only did I graduate from Rutgers Law School, but a few years ago, the Fordham Urban
Law Journal published my history of the school, People’s Electric: Engaged Legal
Education at Rutgers-Newark in the 1960s and 1970s, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 503 (2012).
This symposium demonstrates that engagement with the lives of citizens remains alive
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I. A GOOD DEAL
The “Grand Bargain,” is the exchange of workers’ tort remedies
against their employers, for an exclusive, assured “strict” but
limited . . . liability.”1 As Robert Rabin has explained, workers lost an
unreliable common law right to sue employers for negligently caused,
accidental injury.2 In exchange, a statutory remedy assured recoveries
for accidental injuries arising from and in the course of employment.3
Aside from the exclusive remedy against the employer, as Professor
Rabin points out, tort has persisted, with its promise of full
compensation rather than the limited scheduled benefits of workers’
compensation.4 The third-party action is also complementary because
workers’ compensation health and wage replacement benefits enable
workers to survive and to subsist while third-party actions are
pending as Professor Rabin notes—and as my thirty years of practice
as a plaintiff’s lawyer confirms. 5 The massive, and often protracted,
third-party asbestos product-liability litigation is prime evidence of
that.6 In a comprehensive article, overseer of asbestos Multi-District
Litigation 875 (“MDL-875”) District Judge Eduardo Robreno has set
forth the history of that federal consolidation of claims.7 Employers (or
their workers’ compensation insurers) hold liens on third-party actions
which enable them to recover benefits they have paid.8 Third-party
actions thus offset the costs to employers of the Centers for Disease

1. Emily A. Spieler, (Re)assessing the Grand Bargain: Compensation for Work
Injuries in the United States, 1900–2017, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV . 891, 892 (2017).
2. Robert L. Rabin, Accommodating Tort Law: Alternative Remedies for Workplace
Injuries, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1119, 1123 (2017).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1123–24.
5. Id. at 1124.
6. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS: THE CHALLENGE OF MASS
TOXIC TORT LITIGATION 20–21 (1985), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports
/2006/R3324.pdf.
7. Eduardo C. Robreno, The Federal Asbestos Product Liability Multidistrict
Litigation (MDL-875): Black Hole or New Paradigm?, 23 WIDENER L.J. 97, 108–09 (2013).
8. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 34:15-40 (West 2007). New Jersey’s law is typical; an
employer holds a first dollar lien against a third-party recovery, reduced by one third for
counsel fees incurred by the plaintiff. Id.
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Control and Prevention (“CDC”)-estimated $25 billion annual cost of
work-related vehicular accidents.9
But this Article suggests that calling the rise of workers’
compensation laws across the country from 1910–193010 a Grand
Bargain understates the workers’ gains. It was not much of a bargain
for employers. Rather it was a grand victory for workers and for the
public health. It was the first mechanism to provide critical health
insurance to nearly every worker, regardless of fault, rank, or wage. In
an era in which health, hospital, and disability insurance were either
not widely available or unavailable, 11 workers gained guaranteed
accidental health and disability insurance coverage for the
overwhelming majority of workers injured on the job. 12
One measure of the strength of the workers’ gains is that states did
not follow the example of the Federal Employees Liability Act
(“FELA”).13 That 1908 law allowed tort actions against negligent
employers of railroad workers injured while engaged in interstate
commerce.14 The measure ruled out common law defenses such as
contributory negligence and established a comparative fault
apportionment regime.15 Yet only seamen followed the FELA’s eased
tort-claim path as the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 extended coverage
to offshore sailors.16
As Emily Spieler recounts, the basic structure of the workers’
compensation bargain has been detailed by the premier historian John
Witt17 and in Arthur Larson’s authoritative treatise—Workers’
Compensation Law.18 In my view, the compromise has been

9. On-the-Job Vehicle Crashes Cost Employers $25 Billion Annually, CDC FOUND. (Aug.
24, 2016), http://www.cdcfoundation.org/pr/2016/job-vehicle-crashes-cost-us-employers-25billion-annually.
10. See generally Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, The Adoption of
Workers’ Compensation in the United States, 1900-1930, 41 J.L. & ECON. 305 (1998).
11. Marc Lichtenstein, Health Insurance from Invention to Innovation: A History
of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Companies, BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD,
http://www.bcbs.com/blog/health-insurance.html#.V_xLstUZbME.blogger (last visited Nov.
10, 2017).
12. 1-1 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 1.01 (2017).
13. Federal Employees Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2012).
14. § 51.
15. § 53.
16. Merchant Marine Act of 1920 ch. 250, § 33, 41 Stat. 988, 1007 (codified as
amended at 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2012)).
17. JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN,
DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 128–29 (2004); see also
Spieler, supra note 1.
18. See generally LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (2017).
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undervalued in the discussion today. The doctrines of contributory
negligence, the fellow servant rule, and assumption of risk were indeed
(in the main) abolished in the 1911–1925 period when most states
adopted workers’ compensation laws as an exclusive remedy.19 But the
workers got the better end of the bargain because even a tort system
without the unholy trinity of defenses was an unreliable road to what ill
and injured workers needed most: medical care. The bargain was a
larger labor victory than is often recognized.
The FELA abolished the common law defenses (contributory
negligence, fellow servant, assumption of risk) and adopted pure
comparative fault.20 But it preserved the need to prove “that employer
negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury
or death.”21 Since the tort remedy is a single lump sum payment,
medical and wage replacement benefits did not flow as automatically as
they do in workers’ compensation systems. 22 Such needs were left to the
collective bargaining process by the Railway Labor Act of 1926, 23 which
preceded the National Labor Relations Act.24 The workers’ compensation
laws wisely avoided the FELA model, which, if universally embraced,
would, like all tort actions, be inefficient, uncertain, and incomplete.25
The structure adopted in the Progressive Era (1910–1925)
persists: workers’ compensation laws provide universal coverage for
all workers in an enterprise who suffer injury or illness “arising out of

19. WITT, supra note 17, at 67–72.
20. 45 U.S.C. §§ 53, 54; see also Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506–07
(1957).
Under this statute the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with
reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the
slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought. It does
not matter that, from the evidence, the jury may also with reason, on grounds of
probability, attribute the result to other causes, including the employee’s
contributory negligence. Judicial appraisal of the proofs to determine whether a
jury question is presented is narrowly limited to the single inquiry whether, with
reason, the conclusion may be drawn that negligence of the employer played any
part at all in the injury or death. Judges are to fix their sights primarily to make
that appraisal and, if that test is met, are bound to find that a case for the jury is
made out whether or not the evidence allows the jury a choice of other
probabilities. The statute expressly imposes liability upon the employer to pay
damages for injury or death due ‘in whole or in part’ to its negligence.
Id.
21. Id. at 508; see also 45 U.S.C. § 51.
22. See 1-1 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW§ 1.01 (2017).
23. ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–165 (1935)).
24. ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012)).
25. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 6, at xxii.
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and in the course of” their employment.26 The coverage includes
medical care, wage loss replacement, partial and total disability and
death benefits.27 Workers pay no premiums and there are no co-pays or
deductibles.28 Benefits are not reduced or defeated by a worker’s own
negligence.29 When the fact of injury “arising” from the work is
apparent—as in a motor vehicle crash or a fall—medical care and
temporary disability benefits are generally uncontested and flow
quickly to the injured worker.30 Workers’ compensation provides such
prompt maintenance and medical benefits. Lump sum cash tort awards
do not.
A compensation-claiming worker need prove only the fact of
employment and a work connection to the illness or injury. 31 Coverage
extends to the great bulk of workers, regardless of rank, gender, race,
or union membership. This universality, that a worker injured or
sickened on the job is entitled to benefits regardless of fault, is the first
such coverage for all benefit adopted in our history. The workers’
compensation laws preceded Social Security, which provided old-age
benefits, as well as benefits for the blind and for crippled children. 32
Social Security benefits were not extended to disabled workers until
1973.33
The movement to workers’ compensation was among the first in a
series of laws—many at the state level—that accomplished important
objectives protecting workers’ health and safety. The Progressive Era 34

26.
27.

1-1 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 1.01 (2017).
See SCOTT D. SZYMENDERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44580, WORKERS’
COMPENSATION: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES 11 (2016).
28. See id. at 1.
29. Id. at 2–3.
30. 1-1 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 1.03 (2017).
31. SZYMENDERA, supra note 27, at 11.
32. See Social Security Act, ch. 531, 45 Stat. 620, 620 (1935) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 301–1307 (1940)) (“An act to provide for the general welfare by establishing a
system of Federal old-age benefits, and by enabling the several States to make more
adequate provision for aged persons, blind persons, dependent and crippled children,
maternal and child welfare, public health, and the administration of their unemployment
compensation laws; to establish a Social Security Board; to raise revenue; and for other
purposes.”); Fishback & Kantor, supra note 10, at 305–07.
33. John R. Kearney, Social Security and the “D” in OASDI: The History of a Federal
Program Insuring Earners Against Disability, 66 SOC. SECURITY BULL., no. 3, 2005–2006.
34. Herbert K. Abrams, A Short History of Occupational Health, 22 ADVANCES IN
MOD. ENVTL. TOXICOLOGY 33 (1994), reprinted in 22 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 34, 51–64
(2001), http://courses.washington.edu/envh311/Readings/Reading_09.pdf.
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also spawned limits on the hours of labor and child labor laws, like the
one famously struck down in Lochner v. New York.35
In the Depression Era, profound changes in the relations between
workers and employers were enacted. Chief among these was the 1935
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 36 which established to right to
“concerted action” and led to collective bargaining agreements
strengthening labor unions and launching the era of employerprovided health insurance.37 In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, the
United States Supreme Court abandoned Lochner and upheld a
Washington law governing hours of work. 38 The Federal Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”) brought us the eight-hour day and
entitlement to overtime pay.39
Three decades would pass until a mass movement extended
workers’ rights via Title VII of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964,
barring race and gender discrimination. 40 The 1963 March on
Washington, famous for Reverend Martin Luther King Jr.’s “I Have a
Dream” speech, had as its principal demand: “Jobs and Freedom.” 41
The Federal Coal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1969 created a
federal remedy for coal workers’ pneumoconiosis, commonly called
35. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down law forbidding employers to require employees
to work over sixty hours in a week).
36. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012)).
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate
and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms
and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
§ 151.
37. See Lauren A. Scofea, The Development and Growth of Employer-Provided Health
Insurance,
MONTHLY
LAB.
REV.,
Mar.
1994,
at
3,
4–6,
http://www.bls.gov/OPUB/MLR/1994/03/art1full.pdf.
38. 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (overruling Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525
(1923) (Lochner-era opinion)).
39. ch. 676, § 7, 52 Stat. 1063 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(5) (2010)).
40. Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 703, 78 Stat. 255 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1991)). Compensatory and punitive damages for intentional
violations would later be added. Pub. L. No. 102 -166, Title I, § 102, 105 Stat. 1072
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1991)). For a history of the mass
movement, see T AYLOR B RANCH , P ARTING THE W ATERS: A MERICA IN THE K ING
Y EARS 1954–63, 846–87 (1988).
41. March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. RES. &
EDUC. INST., http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_march
_on_washington_for_jobs_and_freedom (last visited Nov. 10, 2017).
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“black lung.” 42 The federal government paid claims for benefits filed
before December 31, 1973. 43 Claims filed later are paid for by the
Black Lung Disability Trust Fund, financed by the Coal Excise Tax. 44
Industrial accidents and occupational disease epidemics drove the
movement to pass a national health and safety law. 45 The labor
unions, consumer advocates like Ralph Nader, and asbestos
researcher Dr. Irving Selikoff were key allies in the campaign for a
federal workplace safety law. 46 But despite President Lyndon B.
Johnson’s support, no bill was passed during his term, ending in 1968. 47
After a precarious campaign,48 it was in Nixon’s administration that
Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. 49 The
law created the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
(“NIOSH”), as part of the CDC.50 The Federal Mine Safety and Health
Act of 1977 was another step forward for workplace safety.51 But not
until 1994 did the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(“OSHA”) adopt an important measure for the recognition of
occupational disease. The Hazard Communication regulation mandated
Material Safety Data Sheets so that workers could know the chemical
to which they were exposed.52
The struggle continues. OSHA is thinly funded, its penalties are
weak,53 and even its regulatory authority is questioned. 54 Employers, of

42. Pub. L. No. 91-173, Title IV, 83 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§
901–945).
43. § 901.
44. 26 U.S.C. § 4121.
45. Judson MacLaury, The Job Safety Law of 1970: Its Passage Was Perilous,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 1981, at 18, 20, https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1981/03/art2full
.pdf.
46. Id. at 22.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678
(2012)).
50. § 671 (creating NIOSH); National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/about
/default.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2017) (“NIOSH is part of the U.S. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention . . . .”).
51. Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801–878).
52. Hazard Communication, 29 CFR 1910.1200(g) (2012) (requiring that the chemical
manufacturer, distributor, or importer provide Safety Data Sheets (SDSs) (formerly
MSDSs or Material Safety Data Sheets) for each hazardous chemical to downstream users
to communicate information on these hazards).
53. M ARTHA M C CLUSKEY ET AL ., T HE N EXT OSHA: P ROGRESSIVE R EFORMS TO
E MPOWER W ORKERS 1, 2, 10 (2012).
54. Cass R. Sunstein, Is OSHA Unconstitutional?, 94 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1407 (2008).
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course, have long sought to reduce their costs—often to the workers’
detriment—and workers have sought to protect and expand their
benefits. I will discuss shortly the occupational disease struggles that
were fought to expand the scope of protection. But for the moment I
note again that the direct third-party tort action has been
preserved—as have a narrow category of intentional injury cases. 55
As we will see below, the preservation of the third-party action—
particularly
for
product
liability—supplemented
workers’
compensation benefits and invigorated tort law.
II. THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
I want to spend some time discussing this because it has received
little attention so far and because it is a struggle that was hard fought
and ultimately successful in many respects. Perhaps because of my
experience as a plaintiffs’ lawyer in New Jersey for thirty years, I am
less pessimistic than Emily Spieler is about occupational disease claims
and more positive about what was accomplished.
The struggle for recognition of occupational disease as a workers’
safety and health measure has often been a dramatic one. The Zadroga
Act56 and tort settlements for demolition workers at the site of the
World Trade Center disaster57 demonstrate the importance of both the
compensation and tort remedies. The efforts of workers advocates and
scientists to gain recognition of occupational diseases has informed
and improved workers’ compensation law at the state and federal
levels. It has driven the expansion of Social Security to include
disability benefits, the Black Lung Benefits Act, the Coal Mine Safety
and Health Act of 1969, and the 1977 Mine Safety and Health Act.
And of course the overarching Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 which was driven in significant part by the emergence of the
asbestos epidemic in the 1960s.58 These measures are examples of how

55. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973); Laidlow v.
Hariton Mach. Co., 790 A.2d 884, 886–87 (N.J. 2002); 1-1 LARSON’S WORKERS’
COMPENSATION LAW §1.01 (2017).
56. James Zadroga 9/11 Health & Compensation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300mm–300mm-61
(2012); see generally Alvin K. Hellerstein et al., Managerial Judging: The 9/11
Responders’ Tort Litigation, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 127, 128–30 (2012).
57. Transcript of Proceedings at 54, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.,
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2010) (No. 1:21 MC00100).
58. PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL
73–93 (1983).
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labor and progressive advocacy has come to benefit workers far
beyond that of their own membership. 59
In 1964 Dr. Irving Selikoff organized the landmark international
conference, Biological Effects of Asbestos. Sponsored by the New York
Academy of Sciences, physicians and scientists from around the world
reported their observations about the health effects of exposure to
asbestos.60 The U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Standards
reported that coverage of occupational diseases had developed more
slowly than accidental injuries.61 And “coverage of the various dust
diseases ha[d] lagged behind that of other occupational diseases.”62
Professor Larson reports that the fear of the scale of silicosis claims had
deterred adoption of them as within the scope of coverage. 63 Thus New
York, like Ohio and Nevada, retained lists of recognized diseases, rather
than general inclusive definitions. 64 At the time of the landmark New
York conference, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that “by
1920, 45 states and territories had workmen’s compensation laws.
But only seven of these laws . . . and the Federal Employees’
Compensation Act[] had provided compensation for all occupational
diseases.” 65
In 1964, due to the widespread industrial use of asbestos, the toll
was still mounting and legal obstacles remained even to workers’
compensation. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that “time limits
(regarding) length of exposure, to manifestation of the disease, and to
the filing of claims are too short to take into account the slow maturing
nature of dust disease.”66 States often limited medical benefits;
aggregate indemnity benefits varied by state, and waivers were often
permitted.67
But as recognition of the asbestos epidemic grew, and the strict
product liability movement swept the country in the 1960s, 68 the
59. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR & BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, Dust Diseases and Workmen’s
Compensation, in 132 ANNALS OF THE N.Y. ACAD. OF SCIS., BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF ASBESTOS
722, 723 (1965).
60. IRVING J. SELIKOFF, Opening Remarks, in BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF ASBESTOS, supra
note 59, at 7–8.
61. 4-52 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 52.02 (2017).
62. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR & BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, supra note 59 at 744.
63. 4-52 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 52.02 (2017).
64. Id.
65. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR & BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, supra note 59. Only thirty
states provided coverage for “all dust diseases.” Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. George W. Conk, Punctuated Equilibrium: Why Section 402A Flourished and the
Third Restatement Languished, 26 REV. LITIG. 799, 808–09 (2007).
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momentum toward consumer and worker protection yielded the
landmark Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.69 It established
in the Department of Labor a federal workplace safety standard setting
authority: OSHA.70 The Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and
Health Administration 1971 Emergency Temporary Standard limiting
exposure to asbestos dust signaled the beginning of the end of new
exposures to the disease, which had gained belated recognition. 71
Soon thereafter, the coal miners’ pneumoconiosis epidemic gained
enough recognition to pass the federal Black Lung Benefits Act of 1973.72
Administered by the Division of Coal Mine Workers’ Compensation, the
law provides medical, total disability, and death benefits to those
suffering from black-lung disease.73 Amended by the Mine Safety and
Health Act of 1977,74 federal authority over mine health and safety was
strengthened. The measure soon had a favorable impact.75
As observed above, workers’ compensation laws initially extended
only to accidental injury.76 But a protracted, determined—often trade
union led—movement succeeded in gaining recognition of occupational
diseases.77 As Emily Spieler observes, we have not realized the goals
of the OSHA mandated 1972 National Commission on State
Workmen’s
Compensation
Laws.78
The
report’s
“essential
recommendations” called for no exemptions for small firms or
government employees; full coverage for all “work-related diseases”—
not just specified diseases; weekly cash benefits for total disability—
temporary or permanent—of at least two-thirds of the statewide
average weekly wage; and “[f]ull medical and physical rehabilitation

69. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-516, 84 Stat. 1590
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2012)).
70. Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 6, 84 Stat. 1593 (1970) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 655
(2004)); see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.132–1910.140 (2017).
71. Occupational Exposure to Asbestos: Regulation History, 59 Fed. Reg. 40964 (Aug.
10, 1994).
72. 30 U.S.C. §§ 901–945 (2012).
73. Compliance Guide to the Black Lung Benefits Act, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. (Jan. 2001),
https://www.dol.gov/owcp/dcmwc/regs/compliance/blbenact.htm.
74. Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801–804
(2012)).
75. See Michael S. Lewis-Beck & John R. Alford, Can the Government Regulate
Safety? The Coal Mine Example, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 745, 755 (1980).
76. DAVID ROSNER & GERALD MARKOWITZ, DEADLY DUST: SILICOSIS AND THE POLITICS
OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 13 (1991).
77. Id.; Abrams, supra note 34, at 52–54.
78. Spieler, supra note 1, at 935. See 29 U.S.C. § 656 (2012).
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services without statutory limits on dollar amount or length of time.” 79
But despite the downward trends outlined by Spieler, and persistent
exclusions—such as for “casual labor,” domestic, and farm workers—
workers’ compensation has provided benefits to nearly all workers. 80
Typically, statutory medical and disability insurance coverage are
without worker-paid premiums, co-pays, etc. 81 The public, through
Social Security Disability Insurance, absorbs much of the burden of
long term disability. 82 ButTexas excepted 83mandatory workers’
compensation coverage assures that the bulk of work-related injury
medical costs, and virtually all short-term total and permanent
partial disability coverage, remains with the employing enterprise.
III. SILICOSIS: THE KING OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES
The fight for recognition of occupational disease has been a long
one. Though every state now has some form of coverage, the road was
tortuous.84 Employers feared liability claims and insurers worried about
the incalculable costs of prospective workers’ compensation claims.
In order for a disease to be compensable it must be defined and
recognized as causally work-related; in typical statutory language, the
injury or disease must arise “out of and in the course of” employment.”85
For silicosis the problems of definition and causation were substantial.
At the start, there was an obstacle familiar to anyone who has read
Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions86: the theory
that progress is uneven, and is made when one explanatory model—a
paradigm—replaces another. A prime example is that of John Snow, the
79. Notes and Brief Reports: Report of the National Commission on State Workmen’s
Compensation Laws, 35 SOC. SECURITY BULL., Oct. 1972, at 31, 31 [hereinafter Report on
State Workmen’s Compensation Laws], https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v35n10/
v35n10p31.pdf.
80. 9-101 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 101 (2017); Spieler, supra note 1,
at 990–91.
81. Christopher J. Boggs, Benefits Provided Under Workers Compensation Laws, ACAD.
J. Blog (Mar. 23, 2015), http://www.insurancejournal.com/blogs/academy-journal/2015/
03/23/360655.htm.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 423; 14-157 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 157.03[5] (2017)
(stating that one-half of the states and the District of Columbia reduce workers’
compensation benefits when a worker receives SSDI); Benefits for People with Disabilities,
SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/disability (last visited Nov. 10, 2017).
83. See Spieler, supra note 1, at 931–32 (observing that coverage is mandatory except in
Texas).
84. 4-52 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW §§ 52.02, 52.07 (2017).
85. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West 2012).
86. See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
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father of modern epidemiology.87 As detailed in The Ghost Map, Snow
proved by careful mapping that the origin of the 1854 cholera outbreak
in London was a leaking septic tank’s fecal contamination of the Broad
Street pump.88 Snow had demonstrated his theory in a decisive way,
but physicians remained attached to their long-standing theory that
“miasma”—foul odors—was the source of disease.89 Snow, a pioneer in
the use of ether, rejected the theory—but he lacked proof of the
mechanism of disease.90
The miasma paradigm would not suffer a fatal blow until 1882
when Robert Koch revolutionized the prevailing views of “consumption”
(which today we call tuberculosis). 91 Koch identified the tubercle
bacillus, providing a key to understanding the etiology of the disease. 92
The bacteriologist’s finding was revolutionary: the source was not in the
foul air, but in the transmission via sputum from one person to
another.93
The fight for occupational safety and health has largely been a
product of the means of mass production—the coal mines, steel mills,
foundries, textile mills, and all who have used asbestos. 94 But the issue
first gained attention when, in the granite quarries of the northeast,
stone cutters’ work changed from hand drills and sledge hammers to
steam-driven equipment.95 Pneumatic jackhammers were nicknamed
widow makers.96 In 1910, the Barre Vermont Granite Cutters
Journal—a
union
publication—warned
of
“granite
cutters
consumption.”97 Yet the immediate killer was not disabling silicosis—
serious as that was—but rather tuberculosis—the bacterial lung

87. David Vachon, Doctor John Snow Blames Water Pollution for Cholera Epidemic,
OLD NEWS (May & June, 2005), http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/snow/fatherofepidemiology_
part2.html#TWO.
88. STEVEN JOHNSON, THE GHOST MAP: THE STORY OF LONDON’S MOST TERRIFYING
EPIDEMIC—AND HOW IT CHANGED SCIENCE, CITIES, AND THE MODERN WORLD 71–74
(2006).
89. Id. at 74–75.
90. Id. at 144–48.
91. SHEILA M. ROTHMAN, LIVING IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH—TUBERCULOSIS AND THE
SOCIAL EXPERIENCE OF ILLNESS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 179–80 (1994).
92. Id. at 179.
93. Id. at 179–93.
94. Coal miners suffered from pneumoconiosis, textile workers from byssinosis, and
steel and foundry workers from chronic bronchitis and asbestosis. 10 Deadliest
Occupational Diseases in History, HUM. RESOURCES MBA (Feb. 20, 2012),
http://www.humanresourcesmba.net/10-deadliest-occupational-diseases-in-history.
95. ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 76, at 38.
96. Id. at 41.
97. Id. at 39.
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disease to which silicotic workers were especially vulnerable. 98 While
tuberculosis declined for the general population—thanks to the
insights of the germ theory—the disease grew among granite cutters
from 257.7 per 100,000 workers to 953.4 per 100,000 workers. 99 At the
end of World War I in 1917, only four states provided compensation for
occupational disease. 100 The rest adhered to the accidental injury
model.101
A. Breaking through the germ theory paradigm—deadly dust
Bacteriologists, progressive public health workers, scientists, and
physicians were understandably enthralled by the breakthrough
germ theory’s enormous explanatory power. They resisted contrary or
limiting evidence. The evolution of causal thinking about silicosis is
recounted in the David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz’s masterful
study Deadly Dust: Silicosis and the Politics of Occupational Disease
in Twentieth Century America.102 Tuberculosis was seen as a disease
of the poor, especially immigrants crowded in tenements. 103
Progressive ideology focused on social conditions and vice. 104 Though
some were innocent victims of poverty, others were “temporarily
enfeebled” through “alcoholism,” and “other intemperate habits.” 105
Bacteriologists and others at the New York City Department of
Health were of the view that “the danger of infection is largely
diminished by thorough ventilation.” 106
In the enthrall of the germ theory and the haughtiness that the
upper classes so often display to the lower, the public health
community emphasized improvement of workers’ hygiene and their
poor living conditions at home. 107
But a brilliant statistician, then an actuary for the Prudential
Life Insurance Company of Newark, Frederick L. Hoffman proved
to be a key player. His analyses played a major role in overcoming
the prejudices and misunderstandings of hygiene-oriented public

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 41.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 86.
Id.
ROTHMAN, supra note 91, at 181.
Id. at 183.
Id. at 184.
Id. at 183–85.
Id.
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health workers.108 Hoffman conducted a careful study demonstrating
the dose-response relationship between time in the cutting sheds and
the development of silicosis. 109
By the mid-1920s, the germ theory’s limits had been recognized.
Few doubted that inhalation of dust was the root of the lung problems
affecting the workers.110 In collaboration with the Public Health
Service and the Vermont Division of Industrial Hygiene, the granite
cutters union began exhaustive studies of the occurrence of silicosis. 111
The 1924–1926 study was intended to set limits for dust exposure. 112
But the measures led to “little if any improvement.” 113 Significant
changes in production did not come about until the late 1930s when
silicosis among foundry workers, potters, glass blowers, metal
miners, and grinders had been recognized. 114 Like the 1924–1926
study, a 1937–1938 U.S. Public Health Service study confirmed that
practically every cutter with 15 years of experience “could be
expected to develop the disease.” 115
Recognition of silicosis as an occupational disease spurred
successful lawsuits. In 1932, James Hackett, the head of New York’s
Division of Industrial Hygiene, opined that successful civil actions had
brought “silicosis within the range of practical politics.” 116 But
recognition of an occupational disease created other problems: insurers
insisted on lung function tests, which often led to discharge of workers
found to have developed silicosis. 117
B. The Hawks Nest tunnel disaster
Attention to silicosis was heightened in 1936 when it was learned
that at Gauley Bridge, West Virginia, as many as fifteen hundred men
108. ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 76, at 42–43
109. Id.; Hoffman is more often remembered for, and his reputation soiled by, his
specious studies asserting the intellectual inferiority of African Americans. See also Megan
J. Wolff, The Myth of the Actuary: Life Insurance and Frederick L. Hoffman’s Race Traits
and Tendencies of the American Negro, 121 PUB. HEALTH REPS., Jan.–Feb. 2006, at 84, 89,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1497788/pdf/phr12100084.pdf.
110. ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 76, at 43.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. (quoting ANDREW D. HOSSEY ET AL., CONTROL OF SILICOSIS IN VERMONT
GRANITE INDUSTRY, at x (1957)).
114. ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 76, at 43.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 78 (quoting James D. Hackett, Silicosis, N.Y. DEP’T LAB. INDUS. BULL., Dec.
1932, at 11).
117. ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 76, at 79.
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had died of silicosis—almost half of whom were Union Carbide workers
digging the Hawks Nest hydro-electric tunnel.118 The tragedy was
powerfully memorialized by poet Muriel Rukeyser in The Book of the
Dead.119
Overwhelmingly black, the survivors returned home. 120 The ill and
families of the deceased received no workers’ compensation. The
inadequacy of tort remedies was demonstrated; there were only 538
suits for damages.121 The cases settled for an aggregate of $200,000—
of which one-third went to counsel fees. Tort thus provided
compensation for only a fraction of those sickened. 122
Public awareness of silicosis dramatically increased due to the
tragedy. With the support of the Roosevelt administration, Congress
commissioned a study by the Secretary of Labor. In 1936, the
progressive Secretary Florence Perkins123 convened a National Silicosis
Conference.124 Despite the Secretary’s sympathy, the conference was
industry dominated. Management argued that silicosis was a disease
that had attracted “shyster” lawyers and “quack” doctors.125 Changes in
techniques had the disease on the way out argued a lawyer for OwensIllinois Glass Company.126
Rosner and Markowitz recount that John Frey of the American
Federation of Labor argued at the conference that silicosis was a
problem for workers even before they became disabled. When detected
early, workers were often discharged. 127 The disease was not a thing of
the past, but rather continued to afflict workers by the hundreds of
thousands or millions. 128 The National Conference supported the
development of exposure standards and urged that decisions on
compensation be made by expert medical boards—not juries and
judges.129 Despite the support of Perkins, the Department of Labor

118. Id. at 96.
119. See MURIEL RUKEYSER, THE BOOK OF THE DEAD (1938).
120. ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 76, at 98.
121. Id.
122. Id.; see also William “Rick” Crandall & Richard E. Crandall, Revisiting the Hawks
Nest Tunnel Incident: Lessons Learned from an American Tragedy, 8 J. APPALACHIAN STUD.
261, 271 (2002).
123. See generally KIRSTIN DOWNEY, THE WOMAN BEHIND THE NEW DEAL (2010).
124. ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 76, at 102.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 113.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 118–19.
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Senate Bill 2256 introduced in 1939 failed. 130 It would have provided
funds to the states in order to give benefits to silicosis claimants. 131
With the arrival of war, public attention to the silicosis issue
declined. At that time, the industrial efforts, particularly ship
building, exposed as many as 4.5 million shipyard workers to asbestos
as they filled bulkheads with the fire-retardant mineral. In the 1940s
there was a flare up of interest due to the dreadful epidemic among
zinc miners in the Tri-state Mining District near the intersection of
Missouri, Kansas, and Oklahoma; the crisis was addressed by a Tristate Conference which drew Labor Secretary Florence Perkins.132 But
after that flare-up, interest in occupational health again receded.133
Eventually changes in production—the decline of granite cutting, etc.—
reduced the incidence of new exposures, antibiotics helped to reduce the
rate of tuberculosis, and the issue faded from view until a similar but
more dangerous pulmonary pneumoconiosis134 known as asbestosis
again placed occupational disease in the “dusty trades” in the forefront
of public attention.135
IV. ASBESTOS: THE MIRACLE MINERAL AND THE NIGHTMARE THAT
FOLLOWED
In the 1950s, Dr. Irving Selikoff presided over a tuberculosis clinic
in Paterson, New Jersey. He observed the incidence of lung disease
among workers at the Union Asbestos and Rubber Company. 136
Attention had been drawn to asbestos and health when Dr. Selikoff
initiated and organized the 1964 conference, Biological Effects of
Asbestos.137 Selikoff brought together researchers from around the
130. Id. at 130–33.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 135; see also Brown, “Young Men Are Dying”—Frances Perkins’ Visit to
Joplin, HIST. JOPLIN (May 20, 2011, 6:25 AM), http://www.historicjoplin.org/?p=449.
133. ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 76, at 165–69.
134.
Pneumoconioses,
NAT’L
INST.
OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY
&
HEALTH,
https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/pneumoconioses/ (last updated Aug. 24, 2017).
135. See generally I. J. Selikoff et al., The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among
Insulation Workers in the United States, 132 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 139 (1965)
[hereinafter Selikoff et al., Occurrence of Asbestosis].
136. Bruce Lambert, Irving J. Selikoff is Dead at 77, TB Researcher Fought
Asbestos,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
22,
1992),
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/22/nyregion/irving-j-selikoff-is-dead-at-77-tbresearcher-fought-asbestos.html. For more information on the Union Asbestos and
Rubber Company, see Union Asbestos and Rubber Co., ASBESTOS.COM,
https://www.asbestos.com/companies/unarco.php (last visited Nov. 10, 2017).
137. See generally SELIKOFF, supra note 60.
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world.138 The proceedings demonstrated the toll being inflicted on
workers who used the material.139 Eventually Selikoff would estimate
the toll of the substance in an ongoing landmark study of insulation
workers.140 In his landmark 1973 Borel v. Fibreboard141 opinion,
Federal Circuit Judge John Minor Wisdom noted that Selikoff’s study
found that:
Among the asbestos insulation workers examined by us,
evidence of pulmonary asbestosis was present in almost half the
men examined. In this evaluation, radiological change has been
used as the sole criteria. . . . Analysis of our data indicates that
radiologically evident pulmonary asbestosis varied directly with
the duration of exposure. Insulation workers with relatively
short periods of exposure have a significantly lower incidence of
pulmonary asbestosis and this, when present, was generally of
minimal extent.142
The ongoing prospective study tracked insulations workers health. It,
produced dramatic evidence of the illness and deaths caused by
workplace asbestos exposure.143 Selikoff and Lee’s 1978 book144 would
often be cited by courts. In a study for the U.S. Department of Labor,
Selikoff described the enormity of the epidemic estimating that 21
million Americans had been significantly exposed to asbestos.145

138. See id.
139. See Irving J. Selikoff, Mortality Experience of Insulation Workers in the United
States and Canada, 1943–1976, 330 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 91 (1979).
140. See id.
141. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
142. Id. at 1085.
143. Selikoff et al., Occurrence of Asbestosis, supra note 135, at 146.
144. See IRVING J. SELIKOFF & DOUGLAS H. K. LEE, ASBESTOS AND DISEASE (1978).
145. Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1337–38 (5th Cir. 1985).
The opinion stated that:
Dr. Irving Selikoff, in a 1981 study for the Department of Labor estimated that
more than 21 million living American workers have been significantly exposed to
asbestos during the past forty years. More conservative estimates have placed the
number of individuals who experienced significant exposure at between eight and
eleven million or at over thirteen million.
Dr. Selikoff anticipates 200,000 deaths before the year 2000 because of asbestosassociated diseases. Paul MacAvoy of Yale University forecasts excess mortality
due to asbestos through 2015 will range between 154,600 and 450,600, with the
most probable estimate set at 265,000. Johns-Manville anticipates only 18,700
excess mesothelioma deaths and 55,120 excess lung cancer deaths through 2009.
These estimates chart only asbestos-related deaths, not disabilities.
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Selikoff’s authoritative studies were relied upon by courts146 in the
litigation arising from New York naval shipyard work, and by OSHA in
its 1986 Final Rule on asbestos.147
After the 1964 New York conference there was no turning back. As
Judge Robreno notes, Selikoff’s seminal methodical environmental
studies of morbidity and mortality among insulation workers provided
powerful and irrefutable proof that asbestos caused, not only lung
scarring asbestosis, but also lung cancer and pleural and abdominal
mesothelioma.148 Selikoff’s work and increasing environmental
awareness were essential prologues motivating the passage in 1972 of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act, which was quickly followed by
the emergency rule that effectively barred the use of asbestos. 149 That of
Not all individuals who were exposed to asbestos or even all of those who will die
of asbestos-related diseases will actually bring suit. The Epidemiology Research
Institute has estimated that Johns-Manville faces between 30,000 and 120,000
suits, with 45,000 set as the most probable number. Paul MacAvoy has estimated
that there will be over 200,000 new suits, while Conning and Company has
placed between 83,000 and 178,000 by the year 2010. Despite substantial
differences, all sources support the conclusion that asbestos producers and courts
face an unprecedented number of claimants in the years to come.
As latent claims are developing over time, the likelihood that an injured party
will go to court is increasing rapidly. Only 3% of the asbestos-related deaths
between 1967–1968 resulted in law suits, but by 1975–76, this figure had risen to
32%. In estimating the numbers of future suits, experts are assuming that by
1992 all asbestos-related deaths will result in litigation. When this increasing
propensity to sue is combined with mounting numbers of injured parties the
burden on both producers and courts stemming from the asbestos litigation
becomes staggering.
Id.
146. In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1134–35 (2d Cir. 1995)
(affirming the sufficiency of testimony based on studies by Selikoff).
147. Jackson, 750 F.2d at 1331 (“Because the insidious diseases giving rise to these
claims have latency periods ranging up to forty years, the injuries of many plaintiffs will
not become manifest for years to come.”).
OSHA is aware of no instance in which exposure to a toxic substance has more
clearly demonstrated detrimental health effects on humans than has asbestos
exposure. The diseases caused by asbestos exposure are life-threatening or
disabling. Among these diseases are lung cancer, cancer of the mesothelial lining
of the pleura and peritoneum, asbestosis, and gastrointestinal cancer. Of all of
the diseases caused by asbestos, lung cancer constitutes the greatest health risk
for American asbestos workers. Lung cancer has been responsible for more than
half of the excess mortality from asbestos exposure in some occupational cohorts.
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos, Tremolite, Anthophyllite, and Actinolite, 51 Fed. Reg.
22,612, 22,615 (June 28, 1986) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910, 1926).
148. Robreno, supra note 7, at 103; see generally MacLaury, supra note 45.
149. See Johns-Manville Corp. v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 72 (Fed Cl.
1987), vacated, 855 F.2d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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course was an enormous advance, brought about by labor and health
advocates.
Neither silica exposure standards nor any research into the
particular form of pneumoconiosis called asbestosis had prevented the
ubiquitous industrial use of the mineral. The long latency periods of
asbestosis, lung cancer, and mesothelioma meant that the epidemic
first garnered close attention in the 1960s, while thousands of new
exposures were still occurring. But once asbestos diseases were
recognized, the compensation system was able to respond—even if
inadequately. Workers got treated and received modest partial
disability payments. The most ill received Social Security disability
benefits, and their dependents received death benefits from workers’
compensation. The only force that could further reduce the workers’
losses was third-party product liability actions.
A. The era of mass tort claims—asbestos
In Borel v. Fibreboard, Judge Wisdom found the plaintiff’s
evidence showed “that the defendant manufacturers either were, or
should have been, fully aware of the many articles and studies on
asbestosis.” 150 During Clarence Borel’s thirty-three year working
career from 1936 to 1969:
[N]o manufacturer ever warned contractors or insulation
workers, including Borel, of the dangers associated with
inhaling asbestos dust or informed them of the [American
Council of Governmental Industrial Hygienists] threshold limit
values for exposure to asbestos dust. Furthermore, no
manufacturer ever tested the effect of their products on the
workers using them or attempted to discover whether the
exposure of insulation workers to asbestos dust exceeded the
suggested threshold limits.151
Massive litigation followed.
The course of the litigation has been described many times, but one
of the most informative is an opinion by Court of Claims Judge
Christine Nettesheim.152 Johns Manville sought to recover its losses
from the United States, which had required asbestos in its

150.
151.
152.

493 F.2d 1076, 1086 (5th Cir. 1973).
Id.
Johns-Manville Corp. v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 72 (1987).
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specifications for the Navy’s massive ship building campaign. 153 Judge
Nettesheim described the manner in which the asbestos material was
used in Naval construction, capturing the dust-generating process.154
Judge Nettesheim described the state of the litigation: “[Suits against
Asbestos processor Johns Manville] were coming in at a rate of 425 per
month as of 1982. One half of the cases pending in 1982 involved
shipyard workers, and one half of this number resulted from exposures
occurring solely or in part during World War II.” 155 By 1986, 12,630
cases had been filed against Johns Manville. 156
Laments about mass tort litigation are common: the bankruptcy of
over seventy companies, enrichment of plaintiffs’ lawyers, seventy
billion dollars on defense and indemnification, protracted litigation,
clogged courts, political logjams that prevent an efficient mechanism to
resolve claims, and evidence that the most seriously injured are
underpaid and the minimally injured are overpaid. 157 But, as discussed
below, mass third-party litigation greatly increased the competence of
the courts and improved the law.
Plaintiffs’ lawyers used the evidence amassed by the heroic New
Jersey pulmonologist and others to determinedly confront the many
difficult issues in asbestos cases: identification of the defendant
suppliers; multiple suppliers; multiple employers; apportionment of
liability; proving causation of disease; the impact of smoking, the
problem of latency—delayed development of disease many years after
inhalation—when witnesses and records (if any) were unavailable; and
the increasingly skillful use of epidemiological evidence. 158 The latter

153. Id. at 76–80.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 79.
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Pers. Injury & Wrongful Death Asbestos Cases, No.
92344501, 1992 WL 12019620 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001); West Virginia ex rel. Mobil Corp.
v. Gaughan, 565 S.E.2d 793 (W. Va. 2002) (consolidating claims of eight-thousand
plaintiffs and two hundred-fifty defendants); West Virginia v. MacQueen, 479 S.E.2d 300
(W. Va. 1996); Lester Brickman, Ethical Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV.
833 (2005); Paul F. Rothstein, What Courts Can Do in the Face of the Never-Ending
Asbestos Crisis, 71 MISS. L.J. 1, 14–20 (2001); Victor E. Schwartz et al., Addressing the
“Elephantine Mass” of Asbestos Cases: Consolidation Versus Inactive Dockets (Pleural
Registries) and Case Management Plans that Defer Claims Filed by the Non-Sick, 31
PEPP. L. REV. 271, 281–83 (2003); Mark Behrens & Phil Goldberg, Asbestos Litigation
Reform Momentum Builds in US, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (Mar. 2016),
https://www.financierworldwide.com/asbestos-litigation-reform-momentum-builds-in-us;
Joe Nocera, The Asbestos Scam, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2013), https://nyti.ms/2l13aGa.
158. For further discussion, see generally Hon. Helen E. Freedman, Selected Ethical
Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 511 (2008).
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had the benefit of equipping plaintiffs’ lawyers for the next wave of
mass litigation—drugs and medical devices. 159
V. THIRD-PARTY MASS PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION INVIGORATED
TORT
Asbestos litigation challenged courts in three ways: its massive
scale presented organizational challenges, delayed manifestation of
disease, and multiple, often unmeasurable, exposures presented
challenging problems of apportionment of liability. Complex scientific
evidence regarding inferential proof of causation of disease was new to
the courts, which now had to assess the reliability and sufficiency of
epidemiological evidence. Epidemiology is not merely a statistical
method. It is based on a combination of population studies, pathology,
and clinical medicine.160
A. The organizational challenge
Asbestos third-party litigation challenged the courts because of the
large number of cases, presenting courts with a choice: try cases one by
one, allow FRCP 23 class actions, or manage the litigation collectively
through multi district litigation which permits transfer of cases for
“coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings” 161, but in practice
aggregated cases for settlement. The first option was a prescription for
massive delays in justice—for both plaintiffs and defendants. Although
it had some support,162 the class action approach was rejected by the
Supreme Court in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor.163 The Court
there found that individual issues predominated over collective ones,

159. See generally Hon. Helen E. Freedman, Products Liability Issues in Mass Torts—
View from the Bench, 15 TOURO L. REV. 685 (1999).
160.
While epidemiologic information is at times derived from a much wider spectrum
of biologic and medical disciplines, these three—clinical medicine, pathology, and
biostatistics—have almost universal application in epidemiology. Indeed,
epidemiology may be thought of as the joint application of the three in the search
for further understanding of disease etiology.
Jennings v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 14 P.3d 596, 607 (Or. 2000) (en banc) (quoting
George W. Conk, Against the Odds: Proving Causation of Disease with Epidemiological
Evidence, 3 SHEPARD’S EXPERT & SCI. EVIDENCE Q. 103, 120 (1995)).
161. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).
162. Georgene Vairo, Is the Class Action Really Dead? Is That Good or Bad for Class
Members?, 64 EMORY L.J. 477, 528–29 (2014).
163. 521 U.S. 591, 622 (1997).
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making mass personal injury actions uncertifiable as class actions. 164
The consequence was to establish the Multi-District Litigation Panel
as the dominant form of management of large scale tort litigation for
personal injuries. 165
B. Expert testimony—Daubert and the ‘Junk Science’ battle: raising the
quality of expert testimony
By 1991, it was estimated that there were 715,000 asbestos
personal injury claims pending in federal and state courts.166 Almost
all of them involved workplace exposures to the deadly mineral fibers.
They presented judges with enormous challenges, not only in docket
control, but also in legal doctrine. Judge Robreno, who managed the
federal MDL-875 from 2008–2013, stated that “the cases involved
‘difficult issues involving the interface of law and science intersect
with the uncertainties of substantive law.’” 167 Judge Robreno
explained:
Where there are multiple possible causes of the disability, may
liability be apportioned among numerous defendants, or must
the plaintiff prove that the wrongdoing of a particular
defendant is the predominant cause? What is the liability of a
parent corporation for claims against a subsidiary that were
latent at the time the subsidiary was acquired? What is the
applicable statute of limitations, and when should the period of
limitation be deemed to have commenced? Are the plaintiffs
entitled to compensation for “pain and suffering” associated
with the fear of illness or death? All these legal issues are
governed by the tort law of each state. 168
The scale and intensity of mass tort litigation magnified the
issues, as Judge Robreno observed. Ours is an adversary system. Each
side tests the other’s evidence, and tries to present its own most
effectively.

164. Id.
165. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) §§ 22.35–.37 (2004); Eldon
E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323, 2324–
25 (2008); Hellerstein et al., supra note 56, at 176–77.
166. See generally Rothstein, supra note 157.
167. Robreno, supra note 7, at 106 (quoting Paul D. Carrington, Asbestos Lessons: The
Consequences of Asbestos Litigation, 26 REV. LITIG. 583, 591 (2007)).
168. Robreno, supra note 7, at 107 (quoting Carrington, supra note 177, at 591).
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Causation of disease is a particularly closely contested issue. It
has long roots. The drive to identify ground stone dust rather than
germs, nutrition, or hygiene as the cause of granite workers’ lung
disease had helped to advance the use of bio-statistics. Frederick
Hoffman, the Prudential actuary, became an important figure on whom
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics relied.169 Since silicosis had a single
cause, little, if any, attention was given to apportionment of liability
because joint and several liability was the law at the time, and
contributory negligence was a complete defense.170
Silicosis is a signature disease. It is attributable only to silica
dust. More problematic is how to infer individual causation among
multiple sufficient causes. One hundred years ago the New York Court
of Appeals struggled with an upturn in the incidence of typhoid in
upstate New York.171 The City of Rochester had two systems of water
supply, one potable supply for drinking water and the other a nonpotable supply for firefighting. 172 The potable water became
contaminated and many became sick. 173 But typhoid was an endemic
disease with many possible sources. The court rejected the argument
that the plaintiff must rule out all possible non-negligent causes.174 It
would suffice that when there are two causes or more that the plaintiff
need only show “with reasonable certainty that the direct cause was
one for which the defendant was liable.” 175 Two physicians, relying on
a bacteriologist’s proof of contamination and a “table of statistics” for a
period of several years, opined that, in their opinion, the plaintiff had
presented sufficient evidence to conclude he had “contracted typhoid
from drinking polluted water.” 176 The New York high court’s use of
circumstantial evidence—ruling out possible causes to make a
reasonable inference of causation (a method today known as
differential etiology)—was sound.177
169. ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 76, at 24–25, 42.
170. Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1908) (allowing apportionment
according to fault). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE DEFINED § 463 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS:
JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY § 979 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY §§ 12–17 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
171. Stubbs v. Rochester, 124 N.E. 137, 140 (N.Y. 1919).
172. Id. at 137.
173. Id. at 138.
174. Id. at 140.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 139.
177. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 761 (3d Cir. 1994); Creanga v.
Jardal, 886 A.2d 633, 639–40 (N.J. 2005); see also Ruggiero v. Warner Lambert, 424 F.3d
249, 254 (2d Cir. 2005); John B. Wong et al., Reference Guide on Medical Testimony, in
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Nor was much attention paid to evidentiary reliability. The case long
cited for admissibility of a scientific technique—Frye v. United States—
rejected the use of an early lie detector test because its theory was
“not generally accepted.”178 But until Federal Rule of Evidence 702
was adopted in 1974, the only courts relying on Frye’s “general
acceptance” standard were criminal prosecutions. 179 There was
skepticism about the use of scientific evidence because it was feared
that jurors’ awe of the scientist could undermine the integrity of jury
verdicts.180 Judges had restricted use of expert testimony by such
means as rulings that, where a matter was within the common
knowledge of the jury, expert opinion evidence could be excluded as
unnecessary.181 The key 1974 rule change was Federal Rule of
Evidence 702. It provided that expert opinion testimony was
admissible if it would “assist” the trier of fact. 182
The adoption of the new Federal Rules of Evidence was coincident
with the Fifth Circuit’s landmark asbestos opinion in Borel v.
Fiberboard Paper Products Corp. 183 Judge John Minor Wisdom’s
landmark Fifth Circuit opinion is widely credited with opening the
floodgates of asbestos product liability litigation. 184 Soon thereafter
Irving Selikoff’s book Asbestos and Disease was published.185 It has

FED. JUDICIAL CTR. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 687, 704–07 (3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE].
178. United States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522, 1526 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Frye v.
United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)) (explaining that expert opinion based on
a scientific technique “is admissible if it is generally accepted as a reliable technique among
the scientific community”).
179. A Westlaw key cite search for cases citing Frye v. United States shows seventy-two
cases, virtually all criminal cases, until the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 in
1974.
180.
Scientific evidence impresses lay jurors. They tend to assume it is more accurate
and objective than lay testimony. A juror who thinks of scientific evidence
visualizes instruments capable of amazingly precise measurement, of findings
arrived at by dispassionate scientific tests. In short, in the mind of the typical lay
juror, a scientific witness has a special aura of credibility.
EDWARD C. CLEARY, MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 185, at 437 (2d
ed. 1972).
181. James M. Doyle, Applying Lawyers’ Expertise to Scientific Experts: Some Thoughts
About Trial Court Analysis of the Prejudicial Effects of Admitting and Excluding Expert
Scientific Testimony, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 619, 619 n.2 (1984).
182. Id. at 628 (citing FED. R. EVID. 702).
183. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
184. Robreno, supra note 7, at 105 n.44.
185. See generally SELIKOFF & LEE, supra note 141.
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been relied upon in ninety-one published opinions.186 But phenomena
like “synergistic effects” of asbestos use and tobacco exposure created
challenging proof problems. 187 At the outer limit, one had to show
“regular, frequent, and proximate” exposure to the dust. 188
This wide scale use of expert opinion testimony in so-called “toxic
tort” cases changed the course of litigation. 189 Judge Robreno,
manager of the MDL-875 for many years, wrote “[b]y the late 1980s,
it was clear that the courts were faced with the most complicated
litigation in substance and far-reaching in impact in American
history.”190 But these massive asbestos product liability cases—
virtually all arising from third-party workplace tort actions—greatly
increased the competence of the courts in handling scientific
evidence.191
The high point of strict liability in tort was the New Jersey
Supreme Court’s 1982 Beshada v. Johns Manville decision.192 The court
rejected the asbestos manufacturer’s claim that it could not have known
of the dangers of asbestos until Selikoff’s 1964 conference. The court
found as a matter of law that the company was chargeable with
knowledge of the dangers of its products. That principle gave rise to a
duty to warn users.193
Strict liability focused attention on how cause in fact could be
established in what were commonly referred to as “toxic tort” cases.
One view, embraced by Judge Jack Weinstein in the “Agent Orange”
cases, was that only biostatistical evidence could suffice, and that in
such a case “[a]t least a two-fold increase in incidence of the disease
186. Westlaw KeyCite search shows ninety-one published decisions from all U.S.
courts.
187. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM ch. 5,
§ 28, cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (amended 2016).
188. Thacker v. UNR Indus., Inc., 603 N.E.2d 449, 457 (Ill. 1992); Spain v. Owens
Corning Fiberglass Corp., 710 N.E.2d 528, 533 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999), overruled by Nolan
v. Weil-McLain, 910 N.E.2d 549 (Ill. 2009). See generally Wilson v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
189. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM ch. 5,
§ 28, cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (amended 2016); Robreno, supra note 7, at 138.
190. Robreno, supra note 7, at 107.
191. See Margaret A. Berger, The Supreme Court’s Trilogy on the Admissibility of
Expert Testimony, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 177, at 9,
17–18. In 2011, the Federal Judicial Center and the National Research Council of the
National Academies published the third edition of their Reference Manual on Scientific
Evidence. Judges are advised on admissibility and the nature of science, and provided
“reference guides” on the methods of fourteen fields including statistics, survey research,
economic damages, exposure science, epidemiology, and toxicology.
192. 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982).
193. Id. at 549.
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attributable to . . . exposure is required to permit recovery if
epidemiological studies alone are relied upon.”194 This measure had
been suggested as a legal threshold for epidemiological proof of
causation of disease by Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld.195
In 1987 Weinstein and Berger, in their treatise, pointed more
broadly to seven factors for evaluating the admissibility of scientific
evidence: 1) the technique’s general acceptance in the field; 2) expert’s
qualifications and stature; 3) the use made of the technique; 4) potential
rate of error; 5) existence of specialized literature; 6) the novelty of the
invention; and 7) the degree of objectivity and subjectivity of the
technique.196
Many courts emphasized a plaintiff-friendly methodology-based
standard for determining evidentiary reliability with respect to novel or
emerging complex scientific theories of causation.197 In Rubanick v.
Witco Chemical the New Jersey Supreme Court took an expansive view
of competence of experts. It found admissible testimony on individual
causal relationship by a research chemist and cancer researcher—even
though he had never, and would never, examine or diagnose a
patient.198 In Landrigan v. Celotex, an asbestos case in which plaintiff
alleged he contracted colon cancer due to workplace asbestos exposure,
the New Jersey high court rejected the doubled risk standard embraced
by Judge Weinstein and propounded by Black—in favor of a
circumstantial all-things-considered approach.199
Defendants pressed to sharply restrict the use of expert testimony
to opinions which were “generally accepted.” In Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, the Ninth Circuit, in an opinion by the
influential Judge Alex Kozinski, embraced the argument, saying:
194. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 785 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
195. See Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation,
52 FORDHAM L. REV. 732 (1984).
196. 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE MANUAL ¶
702[03] (1987).
197. See, e.g., Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 902 F.2d 362, 363–67 (5th Cir.
1990) (holding plaintiffs’ sole expert could testify that exposure to fumes containing nickel
and cadmium caused decedent's colon cancer and that an expert causation opinion should
be excluded only if “fundamentally unsupported” and “would not actually assist the jury
in arriving at an intelligent and sound verdict”); Osburn v. Anchor Labs., Inc., 825 F.2d
908, 914–16 (5th Cir. 1987) (holing plaintiffs’ experts could testify that chloramphenicol
caused user’s leukemia, that an expert’s opinion “need not be generally accepted in the
scientific community before it can be sufficiently reliable and probative to support a jury
finding”); see also Graham v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 906 F.2d 1399, 1404 (10th Cir. 1990)
(holding plaintiffs’ experts could testify that diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis
vaccinations caused plaintiffs’ brain damage).
198. Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 593 A.2d 733, 735, 749 (N.J. 1991).
199. Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605 A.2d 1079, 1088–90 (N.J. 1992).
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“[t]he best test of certainty we have is good science—the science of
publication, replication, and verification, the science of consensus and
peer review.”200
In Daubert—a drug product liability case—the Supreme Court
squarely faced the question of how a judge should review the
admissibility of scientific evidence when offered.201 While
acknowledging that judges should act as “gatekeepers,” the Court
rejected the “general acceptance” standard as incompatible with
Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The majority embraced as a test of
admissibility the “soundness of the methods employed,” directing
judges to review, not conclusions, but methods, and recognized a
category of “shaky but admissible evidence.” 202
Conservative judges, however, embraced the gatekeeping function
with a vengeance. Daubert told judges to conduct a pre-trial review of
complex scientific evidence. 203 Many courts saw it as a chance to thin
dockets, using it in hundreds of cases to strike civil plaintiffs’ claims.204
The Supreme Court’s 1997 embrace of the abuse of discretion standard
of review of admissibility rulings gave judges wide discretion to act on
their own preferences. Judges could effectively grant summary judgment
on causation without being subject to de novo review.205
In 1999, the Supreme Court declared that all expert testimony was
subject to the Daubert principles.206 Justice Breyer’s opinion for the
court in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael was a substantial victory for
plaintiffs because it emphasized flexibility. 207 And, driven by the wide
range of issues to be reviewed, Justice Breyer provided a sensible
standard—that experts should use in court the degree of rigor
customary in their fields.208 Despite Kumho’s objective standard,
scientific evidence met an uneven reception in the courts—advancing
the rigor with which lawyers approached their proofs.
Shortly after Daubert, hoping to increase judicial competence, the
Federal Judicial Center developed a Reference Manual on Scientific

200. 951 F.2d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled by Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
201. 509 U.S. 579 (1993), codified by FED. R. EVID. 702, as recognized in Kansas City S.
Ry. Co. v. Sny Island Levee Drainage Dist., 831 F.3d 892 (7th Cir. 2016).
202. Id. at 596.
203. Id.
204. D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of
Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 147 (2000).
205. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 138 (1997).
206. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141–42 (1999).
207. Id. at 158.
208. Id. at 152.
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Evidence to guide judges. Now in its third edition the Manual
addresses “how science works,” admissibility and “Reference Guides”
on the use of statistics, estimation of economic damage, epidemiology,
toxicology, and neuroscience, among other fields. 209
Even after Kumho, plaintiffs’ lawyers encountered substantial
resistance by judges who embraced and often rigidly applied the four
Daubert-suggested considerations—now codified in the Federal Rules of
Evidence 702.210 Jerome Kassirer and Joseph Cecil, 211 key contributors
to the Federal Judicial Center’s Reference Manual, identified the
problem and presented their opinions in the pages of the Journal of the
American Medical Association in 2002.212 They explained: “[i]n some
instances, judges have excluded medical testimony on cause and effect
relationships unless it is based on published, peer reviewed,
epidemiologically sound studies, even though practitioners rely on other
evidence of causality in making decisions when such studies are not
available,”213 and that, “[c]ourts tend to assess separately the reliability
of each component rather than assessing the reliability of the ‘totality of
the evidence’ including all relevant clinical factors. In doing so courts
fail to take into account the complex inferential process that lies at the
heart of clinical method reasoning.”214
As had been argued by pro-plaintiff experts in Daubert,215 the
Reference Manual seeks to teach judges that as former California
Institute of Technology Vice Provost David Goodstein explained,
“science is above all an adversarial process. It is an arena in which
ideas do battle,” thus fitting it comfortably into the law’s adversarial

209. See REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 177.
210. FED. R. EVID. 702 (“A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based
on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of
the case.”).
211. Kassirer was the former editor of the New England Journal of Medicine. Joseph
Cecil was director of the Reference Manual project at the Federal Judicial Center.
212. See Jerome P. Kassirer & Joe S. Cecil, Inconsistency in Evidentiary Standards for
Medical Testimony: Disorder in the Courts, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1382 (2002).
213. Id. at 1382.
214. Id. at 1386.
215. Brief for Physicians, Scientists, and Historians of Science as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 479 (1993) (No. 92-102).
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framework. 216 That this proposition has such endorsement is a
victory won by plaintiffs through protracted struggle.
C. Doctrinal challenges
The plaintiffs’ lawyers and their efforts have been widely
disparaged—their success painted as greed, or the product of dishonesty,
etc. Professor Anita Bernstein—a stranger to the litigation—reviewed the
evidence and recognized plaintiffs’ lawyers’ collective achievements as
zealous advocates for their clients.217 In her article Asbestos
Achievements, she concluded from her review of the controversial history:
Asbestos liability . . . reveals clients who were retained and
compensated. Antagonists were won over. Claims were
strengthened by aggregation. Settlements were negotiated.
Procedural hurdles were overcome. Evidentiary rules were
made more permissive. Statutes of limitation, the province of
legislatures, were revised by judges in a plaintiff-favoring
direction. Hazards were exposed. Large business corporations
were brought to their knees.218
How did this come to pass?:
Lawyers advocating for clients effected these achievements.
They rewrote the law of civil procedure and torts, bringing
redress to clients who had started out obstructed by
conservative rules and presumptions. One may debate the
merits of their doctrinal innovations; but at a minimum, their
victories suggest new opportunities to other persons hurt by
negligence and defective products. Even if one grants that these
lawyers were as relentless, dishonest, and greed-crazed as their
foes say—for the record, I will say here I doubt it—they set a
record for achievement that, in magnitude, surpasses what
almost anyone else in the history of American civil justice has
ever accomplished.219
Regardless of where we stand personally in relation to the litigation, we
can share in a collective recognition that the zeal lawyers bring to their
216. David Goodstein, How Science Works, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE, supra note 177, at 37, 44.
217. Anita Bernstein, Asbestos Achievements, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 691, 715 (2008).
218. Id.
219. Id.
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cause is a powerful force and, as here, though imperfect, can do much to
advance the cause of justice.
VI. NETWORKS AND WEBS: FROM MASS PRODUCTION TO
ATOMIZATION AND DIGITALIZATION
Workers’ compensation laws arose in the era of mass industrial
production. They were an important progressive measure to protect
workers from illness and impoverishment.
The common industrial working conditions of workers led them and
their organizations—trade unions—to advocate the expansion of
workers’ compensation systems so as to benefit members and nonmembers. The labor movement and its progressive allies sought to
provide health insurance and other workers’ compensation benefits to
even the lowliest employee in a non-union shop. Workers’
compensation laws turned nearly all contracts of employment at will
into contracts of adhesion—for the worker’s benefit.
This was a dramatic transformation. It is no wonder that business
attacked it. In 1911, the New York Court of Appeals agreed in Ives v.
South Buffalo Railway Co.220 It concluded that the legislation was an
abrogation of freedom of contract, confiscatory because an employer
who has done its duty under the common law was nonetheless
compelled to pay compensation for harms which occurred despite
satisfaction of its duty of reasonable care. 221 The state promptly
amended the state constitution’s Bill of Rights, empowering the state
to establish a workers’ compensation system as an exclusive
remedy.222
220. 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911).
221. Id. at 440.
If the legislature can say to an employer, ‘you must compensate your employee for
an injury not caused by you or by your fault,’ why can it not go further and say to
the man of wealth, ‘you have more property than you need and your neighbor is
so poor that he can barely subsist; in the interest of natural justice you must
divide with your neighbor so that he and his dependents shall not become a
charge upon the State?’
Id.
222.
Nothing contained in this constitution shall be construed to limit the power of the
legislature to enact laws for the protection of the lives, health, or safety of
employees; or for the payment, either by employers, or by employers and
employees or otherwise, either directly or through a state or other system of
insurance or otherwise, of compensation for injuries to employees or for death of
employees resulting from such injuries without regard to fault as a cause thereof,
except where the injury is occasioned by the willful intention of the injured
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In 1911, eleven states enacted workers’ compensation laws. By
1926, forty-six states had workers’ compensation laws. In 1948,
the last state—Mississippi—made such systems nationwide. 223 But
coverage of occupational diseases lagged. Some statutes set up a
“schedule” or exclusive list, specifying particular diseases as workrelated, while others used a more flexible, general definition. 224 By
1920, forty-five states and the federal government had workers’
compensation laws. 225 But a 1964 report of the Bureau of Labor
Standards found that coverage of occupational diseases still lagged
behind that for accidental injury. At that time, only twenty-seven
states allowed permanent partial disability for both accidental
injuries and occupational diseases. The rest either barred indemnity
for all occupational disease claims or sharply limited it, sometimes
setting dollar caps but more often allowing no indemnity at all. 226
Nonetheless, there were significant numbers of cases. For example, in
the period 1952–1961, the Industrial Commission of the Wisconsin
Statistical Department reported that thousands of compensable
occupational disease claims were settled each year—ranging from
1,277 in 1952 to 960 in 1961. 227 Arthur Larson reports that “[s]ince
1950, the number of states having occupational disease coverage has
grown from forty-four to fifty, and the number having general
coverage has risen from twenty-seven to forty-six.”228
Workers’ compensation across the board has afforded a public,
rather than private remedy, and it has been broad in its definition of
employment. While craftsmen were understood to be independent
contractors, nearly everyone else has been treated as an employee. But
employee to bring about the injury or death of himself or herself or of another, or
where the injury results solely from the intoxication of the injured employee
while on duty; or for the adjustment, determination and settlement, with or
without trial by jury, of issues which may arise under such legislation; or to
provide that the right of such compensation, and the remedy therefor shall be
exclusive of all other rights and remedies for injuries to employees or for death
resulting from such injuries; or to provide that the amount of such compensation
for death shall not exceed a fixed or determinable sum; provided that all moneys
paid by an employer to his or her employees or their legal representatives, by
reason of the enactment of any of the laws herein authorized, shall be held to be a
proper charge in the cost of operating the business of the employer.
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 18.
223. SZYMENDERA, supra note 27, at 5, 29.
224. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR & BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, supra note 59, at 723.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 740.
228. 4-52 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 52.07 (2017).
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in the brave new-networked world, the concept of independent
contractor—familiar from tort law—threatens to sharply limit the scope
of coverage. Both a public remedy and broad coverage are at risk. Uber
asserts that its drivers (160,000 in California alone) are independent
contractors who therefore must bear the risk of injury in a vehicular
crash.229 Workers’ compensation has no cap on medical benefits,
mandates disability benefits partially replacing lost wages, and affords
death benefits. The effect of finding Uber’s drivers to be independent
contractors would be to leave them to the vagaries of state mandatory
insurance laws, and their individual choices regarding what first party
insurance to buy.230 It is noteworthy that, according to NIOSH, motor
vehicle crashes remain the leading cause of on-the-job death.231
That
battle—worker
or
independent
contractor—remains
unresolved. Judge Edward Chen, the U.S. District Court Judge who is
handling O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, declared the issue may be
resolved either by a jury or a judge under the California Private
Attorneys General Act.232 The variances of coverage expectable from
each state’s independent contractor laws ideally would impel a national
solution of the sort that the OSHA-created233 National Commission on
State Workmen’s Compensation Laws urged in its 1972 report; the
Commission urged coverage as broad as that afforded by Social
Security, noting that only a third of states covered agricultural workers
and almost none covered household workers.234
On the public remedy issue, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit has relegated Uber driverslike consumers of AT&T
mobile phone services235to private arbitration, blocking a California
doctrine that a bar on class actions was unconscionable. 236 That state
law was held to be preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act, which
229. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1113–14 (N.D. Cal.
2016).
230. See generally SZYMENDERA, supra note 27, at 11.
231. Motor Vehicle Crash Facts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/motorvehicle/resources/crashdata/facts.html (last updated Oct. 5,
2017).
232. 201 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1132–35 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
233. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 27, 84 Stat.
1590, 1616–1618 (1970) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 655 (2004)).
234. NAT’L COMM’N ON STATE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAWS, THE REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAWS 46–47 (1972),
http://workerscompresources.com/?page_id=28 (follow “Chapters 1 & 2”).
235. AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 34752 (2011).
236. Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 836 F.3d 1102, 111012 (9th Cir. 2016) (reversing a
finding of unconscionability by the trial court and holding that arbitrability is a matter for
the arbitrator).
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provides that contracts to arbitrate shall be treated like any other
contract.237
Today, the strength of workers’ compensation laws is under attack.
Though it is unfashionable to say so, the class struggle continues and is
much complicated by the change in technology. We are moving from a
mass production factory model to a network-dominated and atomized
workforce, which many confuse with freedom or autonomy.
Our objective should be to preserve and expand the universalizing
principles pioneered by workers’ compensation laws in the network era.
And we should find a way to achieve the goals outlined in the 1972 report
mandated by OSHA.238 Expansion includes the mandatory extension of
coverage to millions of home-workers, drivers, self-employed carpentry
contractors, and laborers unreasonably classified as independent
contractors.239
We need to establish thatlike employers in the eight-hour-day
eraowners and controllers of today’s network businesses (Uber,
Airbnb, RE/Max, Google, etc.) should be compelled to take on the kinds
of responsibilities that were thrust upon direct employers one hundred
years ago. Doctrinal tools like the relative “nature of the work” test,
independent contractors, overtime, and minimum wage need to be
tweaked to provide for today’s “freelancers” and “part-timers” the kind
of universal coverage that the progressive era reforms provided for the
great majority of workers—even those in small businesses.

237. Id. at 1106, 1108; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or
any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.
Id.
238. Report on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws, supra note 79, at 31–32.
239. 5-63 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 63.01 (2017).

